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 We are building honeypots for document-collecting spies who 
are searching the Web for intelligence information.
 It is important for governments, organizations, and businesses 
to know who is accessing their public documents.
 Further, we may be able to assess the relative degree of 
interest elicited by users in documents.
 One experiment of ours set up a site with bait documents and 
used two site-monitoring tools, Google Analytics and 
AWStats, to analyze the traffic. 
 Another experiment of ours analyzed bot traffic on a similar 
real site, the library site at our school.  
Motivation
Previous honeypot research
 Honeypots have been used from the early days of 
cybersecurity.
 We have run honeypots for many years at our school on lines 
outside the School firewall.
 They are a good way to collect cyberattack intelligence. 
 However, they need to be shaped because different attackers 
are interested in different things.
 We have run SSH honeypots, Web honeypots, industrial-
control system honeypots, and several other kinds.
The honeypot we set up
Example subpage
Design of the document honeypot
 We set up a Web server on what appeared to be a School 
address and monitored its traffic.
 We could not use a real School address, but used one listed as 
being owned by the School.
 We also used graphics and layout typical of the School library.
 We selected 132 unclassified documents in currently popular 
fields of interest covered by the U.S. Department of Defense.
 Documents were 11 areas; most published 5-10 years ago.
 Our server: Ubuntu Linux and Apache 2.4.18 on Dell 
workstation hardware.
 Ports: 80 for web traffic and 22 for SSH.
 We registered our domain name with Google to get it indexed.
Usage monitoring software
 Google Analytics
 Counts site page visits, time on a page, general geographic 
information about visitor IP.
 Requires a tracking ID on the honeypot home page.
 We also created an event trigger to record downloads of 
documents.
 Tries to exclude bot traffic from statistics.  Bots can be 
legitimate like Google’s indexing, but some are malicious.
 AWStats
 Measures similar things as Google Analytics.
 Does not exclude bots, which gave much more data.
 Not as sophisticated at Google Analytics in providing 
breakdowns of visitors by document.
General honeypot statistics
 We ran for 5.5 months.
 The home page had 91.1% of the page views according to 
AWStats.
 There were 87 attempts to use our site as a proxy, mostly to 
Chinese sites.
Most popular pages by Google Analytics
Most popular pages by AWStats







Multi-Task Convolutional Neural Network
for Pose-Invariant Face Recognition
591 328
Surface Hydrostatic and hydrodynamic analysis of
a lengthened DDG-51
207 104
Surface DDG-1000 missile integration 182 211
Policy China's evolving foreign policy in Africa 149 10
Surface Establishing the Fundamentals of a Surface
Ship Survivability Design Discipline
130 220
Special Operations Roles of Perseverance, Cognitive Ability, and
Physical Fitness - U.S.  Army Special Forces
128 19
Surface A Salvo Model of Warships in Missile
Combat Used to Evaluate Staying Power
110 411
Cyber MIL-STD-1553B protocol covert channel 
analysis
109 72
Policy Analysis of government policies to support
sustainable domestic defense industries
92 16
Policy Russia's natural gas policy toward Northeast 
Asia
89 421
Activity over time according to Google Analytics
• The initial burst is typical of new honeypots.
• Other swells likely represent “campaigns” or organized 
querying.
• The September peak is due to a questionnaire we administered 
to human subjects about our site.
• AWStats had a peak more towards June not present above, for 
bot campaigns.
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TOP VISITORS BY USER
Analytics on our real School library site
 The previous work indicated most users were bots.  So it is 
useful to analyze the activities of bots alone.
 We wrote a “sandtrap” script to capture bot resource requests 
at our library.
 This was implemented as a server-side PHP script because our 
site uses PHP.
 We logged the time, IP address, and user agent of the visitors 
for five weeks.
 The library was particularly interested in bots looking for 
email addresses, so we created some pages with link text 
containing addresses.
 We also set up a robots.txt file to request avoidance of certain 
pages, and checked whether bots respected that.










-ed? .pdf .doc .html .pdf .doc .html
Import.io No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
80Legs Yes No No Yes No No No
Scrapy No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Selenium No No No No No No No
ScrapeBox No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
iRobotSoft No No No Yes No No Yes
Anenome No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Selenium was the best, but it does not scale well.  The others were 
not very respectful of robots.txt.
Overall statistics on Web logs
Human Traffic Bot Traffic
Total Requests 334,673 596,028
Average Req/Day 9843 17530
Bandwidth 
Consumed
179.74 GB 39.46 GB
% of Distinct 
Requests
35.96 (36%) 64.04 (64%)
We distinguished human from bot traffic by extracting the “User-
Agent” field of HTTP headers and comparing it to Splunk’s keyword 
list of bot names.  
However, this field is easy to spoof and won’t identify malicious bots.
More statistics
 46 self-identifying bots visited the site using 505 different 
addresses.
 Google, Yahoo, and Bing accounted for 99% of the search 
requests.
 Of 358 requests for files, 216 were for the unrestricted folder, 
142 were for the restricted class folder.
 Unrestricted folder: We observed 21 Web bot campaigns from 
59 IP addresses with 216 resource requests.  11 of these (52%) 
used forged user-agent strings.
 Restricted folder: 16 Web bot campaigns from 25 IP addresses 
with 142 resource requests.  7 used forged user-agent fields.
 40 IPs were in Project Honeypot’s blacklist, but none of these 
requested resources.
Conclusions
 Intelligence gathering is facilitated by the World Wide Web.
 It also appears easy to fool intelligence gathering with 
honeypots.
 We have shown that it suffices to monitor this activity with a 
few simple tools.
 Bot activity is scattered over topics, suggesting that most 
retrievals are done by relatively indiscriminate bots that 
conceal the real interests of human users.  Thus, attempts to 
offer bait were ineffective.
 However, some keywords like “neural”, “DDG”, and “China” 
attracted a bit more traffic.
 Results also showed that content-specific anchors were useful 
in detecting bots, and that bots often did not often respect site 
terms of service.  
